Holistic Development for Nomads
Chapter 5 Data and Observations: Biographical and Livestock-Related
Introduction:
The material obtained from the field work is presented in two chapters. Chapter six will deal with all the subject matter non biographical or livestock-related. This chapter comprises analysis of the biographical information and components of appropriate development related to livestock and herding strategies.
Biographical 5.1
Transition and settlement of the Waso Borana 5.2
Livestock numbers and over-grazing 5.3
Range management and water sources 5.4
Risk taking choices 5.5
Marketting options 5.6
Veterinary services 5.7
Restocking possibilities and NGO programmes 5.8
The Borana restocking ideas 5.9
5.1. Analysis of the biographical information (Page 1 of Questionnaire)
Origins of the interviewees.
Of the 21 people interviewed, four were born in Ethiopia, five had fathers and 14 had grandchildren who were born there. Six of them reported that they still have family living in Ethiopia whom they know by name. Only two men reported going back there to visit.
There were four Sakuye included in the interviewees who confirmed that they had no connections with Ethiopia. All had married Borana in Kenya.
Family size
The number of children living was 110. From a married constituency of 20 this gives an average family size of 5.5. An indication of the fertility of the Borana per adult is shown in Table 3.2 where the number of wives, women and children living and dead are tabulated according to the age of the interviewee.
The number of children who had died within these same 20 families was 16. This indicates an infant mortality rate of 14.5 per cent (145 per thousand).
The size of these families in Waso Borana seem to be small for pastoralist or rural people but it needs to be noted that several of the younger respondents had only recently married, and one was not yet married. One former chief made up for their deficiency by declaring 26 children from three wives. He was obviously proud of his achievement, not only in the number of children, but also of the fact that he had been able to send 17 of them to school. He readily acknowledged that there are few Borana families who can grow as large as his. The only way that he achieved such results was because of his many years as a senior chief when he received what he described as a good wage. Even since his retirement three years before, he continues to receive a pension that allows him to maintain his large household. He obviously still commanded great respect, providing ample evidence to explain why many Borana families aspire to having one of their sons appointed a chief.
Marriage and Divorce.
The majority of the respondents were found to be monogamous.(see table 3.1) 13 of the 19 men interviewed had only one wife, three men had two wives, one man had three wives, one was a widower who had only married once, the other was a young man not yet married. See Table 3.1.
Seven men had suffered the death of a wife, suggesting that the mortality rate for wives is greater than that for children.
The question of wives and divorce was one of the subjects which provoked much discussion. Of the men interviewed, four had divorced one wife, one man had divorced 11 of them. In answer to the question whether monogamy was more common these days because fewer men could afford more than one wife, the reply was usually given that "in the old days Borana would never take more than one wife as traditional culture does not allow it". Most discussions mentioned that divorce was not contemplated by the Borana until Islam came to them.
One of the later questions asked whether the respondent thought that divorce was good for the Borana. Without exception, even from the old man who has divorced 11 wives, the answer was given that it was not good, or should not be contemplated unless under the direst circumstances.
The example of our host family.
One of the families with whom the longest home-stay was made during the field research was headed by a former chief called Dida Kalicha. He had divorced three wives and was currently living with two others. We were invited to live in the compound of the younger one, but were not even introduced to the older one who lived less than 100 metres away in her separate compound. Dida Kalicha was careful to divide his time equally between the two wives and appeared to give equal support to both families which comprised at least five children in each household. Exact numbers were not given.
There was one other household living in the cluster of semi-permanent grass houses which was our main base for several weeks. This was the family of the eldest son of Dida Kalicha, called Mohammed Dida. He made a striking impression when he stated his views on divorce. Mohammed said that he would never divorce his wife as he would not want his children to suffer the same way as he did when his father divorced his mother when he was eight years old. In Borana culture the children remain with the father when the mother is sent away.
The relationship between the three households living as an extended family unit was complex, and probably not typical for Borana society, as Dida also had a sizable government pension. For this reason he was not used as one of the main informants although he was very helpful and knowledgeable about Borana culture, having lived in Ethiopia until coming south to Kenya as a "mature man" in 1955. We were able to ask his advice on many things. One of the first was how we should relate to the three different households in his encampment. He provided some useful insights into how to live in a Borana multi-wife, extended family. "Whatever you give to one woman you must give to all the others". We found it best to bring to him whatever food supplies and gifts we wanted to share with his family and let him divide them between the three wives.
Even though the food and gifts were apparently shared equally between the three women, it was always the youngest wife of Dida Kalicha, called Halima, who provided us with the hospitality normally accorded visitors. It was her tiny guest house which provided us with our shelter during the day. She shared her food with us and even brought water to us at the beginning of our stay. As the nearest well was more than a mile away it meant hauling water by donkey every morning and evening. Once she had fulfilled her duty as the hostess early in our stay we were able to use our own water, and sometimes to share ours with her, when her children were sick.
We never understood the relationship between these three women who all live within a few yards of each other and yet hardly ever meet. We were also left to wonder whether Halima was given all the responsibility to look after us because she was the favourite wife or the youngest.
The effects of imminent drought.
One incident occurred which revealed an aspect of the role and value of livestock which is seldom understood by western observers. In August 1992 the drought was becoming so severe that the people were having to take desperate measures for survival. Halima had to move out of her house at Biliki on the dry plains and went to stay with the animals down on the rapidly drying flood plain of the Ewaso Nyiro river. Dida said that it was too cold at night for the cattle to stay out on the open plain at Biliki in their weakened state. The hyenas were also very hungry and would be likely to attack the sheep and goats in their thorn bomas. Down on the flood plain there was still plenty of course grass which the cattle would eat when they were sufficiently hungry. There were also many thorn bushes which could be cut to make shelters and strong bomas for the animals. Halima made herself a shelter from thorn branches and grass, and was going to live down there with her five children.
The examination of the goat entrails brings joy.
Before she went, ex chief Dida performed a ceremony which was illuminating and thought provoking. He said that he wanted to slaughter a goat in our honour, so that we could eat together before "his family moved away". He regretted that none of his animals had enough meat on them to be worth killing, so arrangements were made to buy one from another flock, for which some cash was requested from us. When the newly acquired goat arrived back at the camp it looked no larger or healthier than any of Dida's shoats, but it was duly admired and then taken care of by his son, Mohammed. Before the carcass was divided between the three households, the two men, scrutinised the intestines very carefully, with much folding back and forth of the entrails. Eventually the old man began to get quite excited and declared that the rain had already started. He pointed out certain configurations of blood vessels and fat which he said indicated without a doubt that it was raining hard on the hills to the west from which the Ewaso Nyiro river came. He was referring to the northern Aberdare mountains and the slopes of Mount Kenya which form the catchment basin of that river. He was also sure that the intestines told him that there was a big water coming down the river in three or four days. This gave great cause for rejoicing as Dida was one of the Borana who have started to practice cultivation on the north side of the river between Malka Daka and Korbicha. His wives each had several acres, so that between the whole family they seemed to have about five hectares under cultivation. They had planted the last time the river flooded in March, and had irrigated twice before the water disappeared. One more flooding was needed to prevent a total loss of the crop which was looking very dry and already dead in some parts. Dida was sure that the river would come back in time to give them something for a harvest, even though this was not the usual time for the river to flow.
As we left the area the next day, we called into Merti to say good-bye to Father Pius, who had been so helpful to us. He told us that he had just received a message via the police radio that a big flood had passed under the bridge 150 kilometres upstream the previous night. He was telling the people to be careful to get their animals and camps out of the river bed. This was not a time that the river was normally expected to flood. We were able to cross the dry river bed before the flood came, to travel from Merti to Garba Tula. Once the river floods, this journey which takes one hour in the dry season can take five to eight hours since the bridge at Malka Daka was destroyed, requiring a long detour to use the bridge at Archers Post. This incident is reported at length as it gives some indication of the reality of the supernatural world of a pastoralist, one who had been a chief for many years, even under the colonial administration.
5.2. Transition and settlement of the Waso Borana.
The Waso Borana appear to be in a state of transition from traditional nomadic pastoralism to a combination of pastoralism and various livelihood options and survival contingencies. The transition in Isiolo District is probably proceeding faster than the normal diversification strategies of other pastoral nomads for the following reasons:
1. They have moved to their present grazing lands in Eastern Isiolo only relatively recently, since 1933. Little time has elapsed for establishing strong traditions as in the Borana of Southern Ethiopia.
2. They have suffered greater herd losses than almost any other pastoral group in Kenya, due to the shifta wars, 1963-1969. The only worse affected group could be the Sakuye who seem to be in a process of assimilation by other ethnic groups, especially the Borana. The Sakuye lost more animals because they specialized in camels which were the primary target of the Kenyan military forces seeking to suppress the shifta problem.
3. The Waso Borana have been cut off from the Gutu Borana of Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia by the Rendille/Somali Axis which cuts across the northern grazing lands.
4. The Waso Borana have had to bear the brunt of the advance of the Somali pastoralists spreading westwards from Wajir. The different Somali clans may fight between themselves but they often combine in their attacks on their neighbouring ethnic groups in Kenya. The Borana have been on the retreat from the Somalis during most of this century in the face of official Somali expansionist policies and the constant harassment of well armed raiding parties.
5. Since independence, the Kenyan government in Nairobi has been dominated by politicians from the South who do not understand the benefits and strengths of Nomadic Pastoralism. Rather than see the contribution they can make to the national economy, they have adopted policies designed to eliminate pastoralism as practiced by the Borana. Where there is official recognition of the productive potential in Eastern Isiolo it is more concerned with irrigation projects than pastoralism. (District Development Plan 1989 -1993:7)
An expert opinion - 10 years ago.
Richard Hogg, who has spent considerable time over the last 15 years studying the Borana and Turkana of Northern Kenya, describes the situation he found in 1984 thus:
In Isiolo District, as amongst the Turkana, the lifting of colonial restrictions on inter-district movement has been followed by a vigorous attempt on the part of government to expand elements of permanent infrastructure, such as schools, dispensaries and communications. Recently completed projects are the Garba Tulla telephone exchange, a bridge across the Ewaso River at Malka Dakaa, a dispensary at Gafarsa (and others nearing completion at Iresa Boru and Dadacha Lata) and a new primary school at Mado Gashe. Yet projects intended to boost the livestock sector have languished, and district food security is no better now, probably a lot worse, than twenty years ago (Hogg, R. 1984. pp. 47 - 58.)
Settlement leads to de-forestation and over-concentration.
Hogg continues his indictment of faulty policy by extrapolating the ill effects of misguided development on the environment and economy to the point that desertification takes over, as witnessed during the first period of field research at the beginning of 1992.
These developments were reflected in a population shift from the pastoral areas to the urban centres, such as Garba Tula, Merti and Mado Gashe, where famine relief could be obtained, and to the Ewaso River, a traditional dry season grazing area, where irrigation schemes, primary schools, and medical dispensaries were established. The vacuum created by Boran departure from outlying livestock areas was partly filled by Somali pastoralists moving in from Garissa and Wajir districts.
Today Boran are concentrated near to the Ewaso River, or to the south, around such local towns as Kula Mawe, Garba Tulla and Kinna. This distribution of population is partly the result of poverty, partly the result of the concentration of government services such as primary schools, dispensaries and police posts along the river and in the local towns, and partly because of lack of security. As Somali pastoralists have infiltrated into the district (as a result of the lifting of colonial restrictions on inter-district movement) there has been a considerable upsurge of Shifta (bandit) activity. Such is the intensity of this activity that Boran fear to go too far from the river. As a result Boran have effectively lost a significant portion of their wet season grazing land and are increasingly squeezed against the river. Government and donor agencies have done little to arrest, let alone reverse, this process. Indeed, their interventions have only encouraged more of the same. Wherever Boran have congregated, shops, primary schools, dispensaries, and police posts have followed, creating permanent settlements and, eventually, small towns. The result is deforestation along the river and the extension of the desert margin into once important dry season grazing areas. (ibid, p. 55).
The transforming effect of the rains.
This perception of the problem as described by Hogg needs to be qualified by the observation made during the second period of field research in 1993 as an example of the inadequacy of making assessments on the basis of incomplete experience leading to seasonal bias. When the first period in the field ended, in August 1992, the overgrazed land close to the population centres was assuming a desert-like condition as Hogg describes. It was most remarkable to see the transformation by January 1993 when the rains had swept across the whole country. During those five months the grass had sprung up again through the dust of the semi-desert to attain a height of between 30 to 50 cm's.,- swaying and rippling in the wind like the standing barley crops on the white highlands just 100 kilometres to the South. This transformation in the ecology and the economy of the Waso Borana was one of the most striking differences observed between the situations prevailing during the preliminary survey of 1992 and the questionnaire report of 1993. The herdsmen expressed it as the ideal of pastoral life - when the grass returns in such abundance that the surviving animals are "defeated to finish it". The youngest children can watch them as the cattle will not go far away. The adults can stay close to home and rest for many months.
Some of the successful herdsmen even thank God for the drought that is past, as it serves to eliminate the weakest animals and the least competent herd managers. They know that life will be easier for the survivors for the next few years, until the herds start to build up again.
5.3. Livestock numbers and the over-grazing debate
There was no apparent reluctance amongst the Borana to give numbers of animals in the herds as is usually the case amongst West African pastoralists. The questionnaire asked for information regarding numbers inherited from their fathers and the number at present in the herds. This question had to be modified in practice as it was soon evident that there had been exceedingly heavy losses over that last six months. During the first survey period from May to August 1992 it was obvious that a serious drought was prevailing. This was evidenced not just by the numbers of carcasses lying around the bomas but even more significantly by the fact that the carcasses were left with their skins on. This is the sign of real disaster when there are too many dead animals and the people so weak that they are unable to remove the skins and thereby lose even the small income that comes from selling the hide.
The full extent of the losses during the 1992 drought was revealed by the figures comparing numbers of animals at the beginning of that year and the number by the end of the year when the rains had returned. The totals given from all respondents were: cattle 1712 and 438, shoats 3405 and 348. This represents a survival rate of 25.6% for cattle, 11.7% for shoats.
Comparing the numbers inherited from their fathers with those before the 1992 drought a relatively small increase was reported.
For cattle this was 1606 - 1712 - a 6.6% increase
For shoats this was 2490 - 3405 - a 36.7% increase.
In contrast, the figures given after the 1992 drought compared with those inherited from their fathers show the following decreases;- 72.7% for cattle, 82% for shoats. This affords an indication of the long term trends and short term swings in livestock numbers in the herds of the Waso Borana.
The realities of pastoral economies
Losses on this scale would appear to be ruinous, viewed from a commercial western perspective, but they were regarded with apparent equanimity and lack of concern on the part of those who had suffered such devastating losses. This is probably an indication of two realities of pastoral economies. Firstly, the acceptance of the inevitability of repeated heavy losses. Secondly, the awareness that livestock numbers can rapidly be restored as long as grazing and security return. In fact, one or two of the respondents remarked that it is usually after the times of greatest losses that fastest rates of recovery are enjoyed. The number of animals using the grazing is so diminished that the survivors have less competition, meaning not only more grass to eat but less distance to walk to get it.
Undergrazing or overgrazing
Hogg shares the view of many other ecologically sensitive experts, that the connection between overgrazing by pastoralists, desertification and deforestation is complex and not a direct relationship to overstocking. It is true that trees along the Ewaso Nyiro have been greatly reduced in recent years, but this is not mainly due to the pastoralists, but to the work of the ex-pastoralists who want to clear land for cultivation or use the wood for building non-Borana type houses or making charcoal. Some of the pastoralists pointed out during travels across their grazing lands that there are now many areas - thousands of acres - which have been taken over by thorn forest and scrub which used to be good grass land. They blamed this problem on the lack of security, and the devastating stock losses since the Borana moved into the Waso area. They no longer have enough animals to need all that grazing, and they do not feel safe to use those areas, even when drought is most severe.
This implies that undergrazing can be as much of a problem as overgrazing, perhaps more so. Grazing can be restored by one good rain, however sandy and windswept the empty plains may appear, but recovery of grasslands lost to bush and forest takes many years. It is a long term if not permanent loss to the pastoralists. Hogg describes this problem thus:
Leaving rangeland understocked my be just as harmful as leaving it overstocked. For a start, grass which is unused means potential milk and meat lost to the pastoralists; but it also means range degradation through the invasion of bush. This may be as serious for long-term range productivity as desertification itself (ibid 58).
The confusion between overstocking, overgrazing and rangeland degradation appears to be one which leads to the greatest misunderstanding. There is undoubtedly a connection between overgrazing and overstocking but as already observed, degradation can be caused by too few animals and undergrazing as well as by too many.
One example of the confusion surrounding this subject and the differences in expert opinion is demonstrated in the debate between de Queiroz, White and Abel over range degradation and productivity in Botswana. De Queiroz began the debate by challenging the conventional view of range degradation propounded by Clements in 1936 and usually referred to as "vegetation succession". He describes this as a "model of vegetation dynamics which views vegetation change as a deterministic series of vegetation types leading to a 'climax' community that may fluctuate in composition but remain relatively unchanged over long periods of time". (de Quieroz. 1993:3) He noted that this model of succession has been called into question since 1978 and that its usefulness in semi-arid and arid land conditions in particular has been challenged since 1985 (O'Connor). Consequently de Quieroz concludes that a paradigm shift is occurring in the way the range profession views rangeland dynamics.
Several other writers, starting with Sandford 1983, Behnke 1993, Biot 1993 have also pointed out that there is little if any direct relationship between degradation and the carrying capacity of the range because different species of domestic animals thrive on different types of vegetation. As de Queiroz describes it:
The desirability of any one vegetation type becomes a function of the management objectives, provided the basic ecosystem process such as nutrient cycling and energy flow are not damaged. Thus, a patch of rangeland that is in good condition for goat production maybe in poor condition from the view point of cattle production.
It follows from the above that usefulness of the term 'degradation' has no meaning unless the context in which it is used is clearly outlined. In fact there is a consensus emerging among range ecologists that the term 'degradation' should be reserved for irreversible ecosystem changes. In other words, degradation entails a management - induced impact which damages basic ecosystem processes and compromises the ecosystems's ability to regenerate itself on its own accord. changes that are confined to reversible shifts in vegetation structure and plant species composition are better referred to as 'desirable' or 'undesirable', depending on management objectives. (de Queiroz 1993:4)
The other main proponent in this debate is Richard White whose major emphasis in two papers presented in 1992 was to show that large increases in cattle numbers in Botswana were not accelerating degradation of the range. He makes the point in 1992a that:
the most telling argument against degradation is that productivity, in terms of meat output per animal, has not declined. It has increased. While dressed carcass mass at slaughter, calving and off-take rates have not changed since 1966, the average age of cattle at slaughter has declined from seven years of age in 1966, to four years of age in 1990. (Setshawelo pers. comm.). If degradation had occurred since 1966 we would expect to see lower calving rates, lower off-take rates, lower dressed carcass mass and greater age at slaughter. We see nothing of the sort. (White 1992a: 46)
White asserts that lowering the stocking rate may well reduce the productivity per hectare and provides an interesting explanation why this should be: "One of the primary plant responses to herbivory is to grow faster - so increased grazing pressures stimulates primary production leading to an increase in secondary production." (White 1993: 15)
White supports his assertion by referring to research conducted between 1982 and 1986 by Abel and Blaikie, which "showed that there is no clear link between change in grass-land species composition and livestock productivity."
Abel has also entered the debate with a helpful observation that the situation in Botswana is complicated by the fact the livestock development policy there is being affected by ideological and political considerations.
A new livestock development policy is being promoted by the Government of Botswana (Ministry of Agriculture 1991). This aims to privatise extensive areas of range, fence it and set stocking rate to 'carrying capacity'. This policy would, if it meets its aims, affect livelihoods, nutrition and livestock exports as well as ecological systems. Unfortunately it is written in apparent ignorance of the debate, and rests on old dogma. White (1992) challenged the policy on it biological, ecological, social and economic assumptions and effect. In a current Pastoral Development Network paper, de Queiroz while agreeing that the new policy would carry a high social cost, argued that White had ignored the reality of range degradation in Botswana. He also claimed that there was no basis for White's statement that de-stocking, would decrease the productivity of rangeland. This interchange is a fruitful development of the debate, which I join in an attempt to clarify it.
I assert that policy-makers seek evidence to support their political agendas. They want proven evidence, and they wish to disprove the positions of other political groupings. It is my view that the carrying capacity concept, and the stocking density recommendations which stem from it, have been seized upon by the emerging middle class of Botswana as a justification for the privatisation of rangeland. Conservation and certain productivity arguments happen to coincide with, and are therefore employed to back policies which have their origins not in science, but in ideology. Part of this ideology is belief that the commercial ranch is more productive that the 'traditional' communal agro-pastoral system. Groups opposing this position identify with the peasant farmers who would be harmed by privatisation. (Abel 1993: 1-2)
Abel continues by asserting: "The conventional view of degradation is tied to the notion of 'carrying capacity'. This coincides with the stocking rate which does not cause degradation. The implication is that when density is at or below carrying capacity land does not degrade. When carrying capacity is exceeded, degradation begins. (Ibid. p.6)
All three range scientists, White, de Queiroz and Abel appear to agree on the undesirability of yielding to ideological and commercial pressure to allow privatisation of the Botswana range lands at the expense of open grazing pastoralism. They also seem to share the view that the "Clementisian model of succession as a basis for assessing range condition" is likely to be superseded by a model first referred to by Westoby as the 'state and transition' model (Westoby et al. 1989). As de Queiroz summarises "This view allows for a number of relatively stable vegetation states at a particular site instead of a linear and deterministic progression culminating in a stable 'climax end-point'". (de Queiroz 1993:4)
"The tragedy of the commons" as understood by the Borana
One notable example of the difference between western thinking, meaning commercially based, and the value system of Nomadic pastoralists is shown in the logic used in the well known case of `The tragedy of the Commons'. Garrett Hardin, a genetic biologist, used this example in 1968 when making his case for human population control by coercion, rather than by allowing freedom of choice or appealing to conscience. He was actually quoting from a pamphlet written in 1833 by a much lesser known writer named William Foster Lloyd. Lloyd was a mathematician who used the example of over-populated common grazing land to make a point in economic reasoning. He assumed that each 'rational' herdsman will continue to increase the size of his herd as he believes that he will receive virtually all the products and proceeds from each additional animal. Expressing this mathematically, the negative utility for any particular herdsmen is only a fraction of -1 whereas the positive utility is something very close to +1. The larger the number of animals grazing on the commons the smaller becomes the fraction of the negative utility as this is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one additional animal. This, of course, is not the way that a typical pastoralists would express the problem but they are certainly well aware that the effects of increase numbers of animals will be shared by all the other herdsmen. It is their approach and response to that situation which produces the major difference between the understanding of the problem as interpreted by Hardin and that of the Borana, and probably any other nomadic pastoralist society. They do not think in terms of competition with others within their group of grazing partners but of sharing together their limited resources and the knowledge they have of how best to use those resources. Pastoralists do not see grazing as something to be exploited to the maximum for individual advantage but as a communal property which must be harvested responsibly and even improved through wise stewardship. The Borana evidence the same concern seen in several other pastoral groups to protect their pasture not just from extraneous intruders but from the excesses of their own people. When asked what sanctions would be incurred by any individual herder trying to act alone and take more than others from the grazing the Borana were hard pressed to answer as they could not imagine such a situation, or perhaps were embarrassed to even think about it. Some pastoralists seem to respect and care for their grazing land only slightly less than their animals, presumably realising how important they both are and guarding them as strictly and carefully as they do their wells.
The difference between the pastoralists view of shared responsibility and Hardin's "worst case scenario" of population control is basically one of different societal values. He speaks of a world governed primarily by the principle of "dog eat dog", where the number of children a family had would not be a matter of public concern. Parents who bred too exuberantly would leave fewer descendants, not more, because they would be unable to care adequately for their children".
After many hours of listening to their discussions the conviction is reached that pastoralists look at these subjects from a totally different perspective than the individualistic and competitive mind set which produces Hardin's reasoning and interpretation. These discussions also yielded other interesting insights. The following are some verbatim examples.
"The grass is always stronger than we are. When the rains fail many animals will die but when the rains return the grass will come back even stronger than ever. There will be fewer animals to eat it so for those people and animals who survive the drought there will be good years. -- The herds will be replenished quickly and the weakest animals and people will be gone. -- It has always been that way, people and herds increasing slowly at first, then faster and faster until the grass runs out again." The weakest the laziest, the unluckiest will drop out . Those who survive will soon be strong again. It all depends on the grass.
In one discussion with a group of senior, drought hardened, pastoralists they acknowledged the same "inevitability of destiny" which Hardin describes as the "Tragedy of the Commons". They appeared to accept or even welcome drought as being the opportunity to prove and improve their herding skills, - the best way to allow the good herd owners to survive whilst eliminating the least competent the laziest, and those un willing or unable to take the decisions of risk. They even use expressions which sound remarkably like the philosophy of Whitehead from whom Hardin "borrows" the use of the word "Tragedy". "The essence of dramatic tragedy is not unhappiness. It resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things."
Rational choices of survival strategies
The Borana demonstrate their recognition that the grazing resources are finite and limited in another way that will be mentioned further in the following chapter in how they regard education. Most of them seem to appreciate that only a limited number of their children will be able to follow the pastoral life style. Some were able to say how they chose which sons would be staying with the herds, and what plans they had for the other children. In a society which knows nothing of family planning it was surprising to find that their career planning usually allowed for no more than two sons who would be expected to stay as herdsmen whilst alternative options were discussed for the others, both male and female at a very early age. There was only one man who said that he did not want any of his children to remain as herdsmen, but he was one who had suffered the loss of nearly all his animals to shifta and sickness.
An economists view of overgrazing.
A more recent analysis of the causes and consequences of overgrazing is given by Livingstone in an overview of pastoralists practices. Some of his statements are presented here as a basis for understanding the problem.
1. The main reasons for pastoralists increasing the numbers of livestock they hold are either (i) that their holdings are low in relation to subsistence requirements, true of a very large proportion (ii) that they are needed as a cover for risk, which may call for a herd several times bigger than the subsistence requirement; or (iii) as an investment.
2. This investment is based on securing a high rate of return from livestock using the expanding availability of forage during a succession of good years, using an 'opportunistic' strategy, though involving a risk each year of drought. Restriction of cattle numbers during good years is likely to reduce, not increase, the capacity of the individual pastoralist to withstand drought.
3. Restrictions on the pastoralists' capacity to tap the benefits of good years or substitute of fixed-location modes of production which do not secure such benefits involve opportunity costs. Livingstone 1984 (i)
This is a useful analysis of the economic reasons for what is often described as 'overstocking'. It reflects the perception of an economist as it has one major omission. It makes no reference to the unquantifiable subjective value that all pastoralists give to their animals - particularly to a healthy and balanced herd.
The value of a healthy herd.
There are some scientific researchers who dismiss this subjective value as 'irrelevant romanticism' but anyone who has lived for a time amongst any true pastoral group - nomadic or semi nomadic cannot fail to see its significance. It is most apparent with large stock such as camels and cattle where it reveals itself in its highest form as a specialisation in shape or colour of the herd. In the ideal situations where grazing, water and security allow the luxury of individual preferences, such idiosyncrasies as the shaping of the horns of the cattle into artistic designs can be indulged. There are still examples in Africa of herd owners deliberately culling out animals that do not conform to the chosen colour of the rest of the herd, regardless of their milk yield. For any who question this subjective value of a herd of well chosen animals to a genuine pastoralist, one night in a Dinka or Fulani camp should suffice to dispel any doubts. The relationship between many pastoralists and their animals can appear as almost sensual or erotic in the way the herdsmen will caress and sing to their animals. Camels do not seem to enjoy the same level of physical contact with their owners but the manner in which a good herdsman can communicate with and control them at watering, milking or loading times is an indication of something much deeper than economic value only.
All these animals play an essential part in establishing a man's social status within his society, especially in gaining respect for his handling of them at drought times and the social alliances he can gain through them by marriage arrangements.
In traditional Borana society a man may enjoy great social status by the astute deployment of his cattle. A truly wealthy and honoured man is one who has had many cattle but gave them all away to fellow clansmen so that he has none left to look after himself. he will be welcome in any home and can drink the milk of many animals without having to look after any of them
Livingstone's assessment of the reasons for over stocking may be a deliberate attempt to avoid the error described by Dahl as a tendency of placing undue emphasis on the social value of cattle ownership.
"Ever since Hersokovit's definition of the "East African cattle complex" in 1926 much interest has been focussed on the social value of cattle, often without relating it to the consumption requirements of the household. Such a preoccupation with the cosmological aspect of cattle easily leads to a misunderstanding of the rationale for an individual household keeping many cattle" Dahl 1976:16
It is probably as wrong to neglect this factor as to over emphasize it so this study will seek to maintain a realistic and reasonable balance.
5.4. Range management and water sources
During the protracted group discussions on the livestock questions much useful information was divulged about the grazing patterns practiced by the herdsmen north of the Ewaso Nyiro river. This is administratively defined as Merti division and constitutes half of the land area of Isiolo District. (see Map 2) It has the lowest population in the district, if not the whole country of Kenya, at 0.58 per sq. kilometre according to the Kenya population census of 1979. Merti division is classified as Eco-climatic Zone VII, very arid or semi desert, yet the herdsmen who live there describe it as the best grazing in Kenya. They would readily and naturally begin to draw maps in the sand on the ground showing the present main grazing areas using existing water sources. Most of them could also point to other large areas which are presently unusable because there is no water available in the dry season. This information is presented in the order and manner in which it was given by the group of herd owners who met at Dida Kalicha's house to give it full authenticity. The information derived from the sketch maps drawn and redrawn many times in the sand is shown in Map 3.
Main grazing areas and Boreholes used by the Waso Borana.
1. Sabarawa - the furthest northwest. 50 kms east of the Isiolo - Marsabit road, 100 kms north of Archers Post. Water is found by digging some few feet into the laga called Sabarawa. The other side of laga is Samburu country.
2. Kom - South of Sabarawa about 30 kms. Water is found in the sand of Laga called Kom.
3. Nyachisa - Southeast of Kom 10 kms. Permanent water is found in this laga.
4. Haredida - 15 kms from Nyachisa. Permanent water in laga called Komcharadi.
5. Kuro Bisan Owo - meaning hot salty spring. 10 kms from Haredida
6. Mado Wata - Mado means a small well. About 20 kms west of Kuro Bisan Owo.
7. Mado Gurga Huka - West again about 20 kms.
8. Mado Halkano - first grazing place in Merti Division. Southeast of Haredida.
9. Barambati Wako - (meaning saviour of the season) About 15 kms northwest of Merti. Wells dug in Laga (best grazing)
10. Barambati Fayo - (Fayo is name of the first Borana in the area who dug this well not more than 20 years ago) About 15 kms north of Merti
11. Mado Molu Kioo - due north of Merti about 30 kms. Hand dug by grandfather of present student Jomo Kosaye Molu.
12. Bambota - name of the area. 20 kms northeast of Merti. Hand dug wells in Lago Bambit. All those wells come from 2 lagas which start at Sabarawa, fed by rain which falls on the Wamba hills.
Boreholes used by the Waso Borana
1. Bulta Bonsa: East of Bambota 20 kms. 60 kms from Merti. ( Duma is a new bore hole being constructed by Action Aid about 5 kms from old Bulta Bonsa which never worked due to lack of machine
2. Yamicha: 15 kms east of Duma. 95 kms northeast of Merti. Borehole constructed in 1981 by Ministry of Water Development - in excellent grazing area. Herders have to pay 1 litre of diesel for every 100 cows @ 17.50/-per litre. (Price of fuel in Merti is 350/- per 20 litre jerrycan + 30/- transport.)
3. Urura: About 30 kms south of Yamicha. Also completed in 1981. -Can only give sufficient water for 1,200 cattle per day. Requires 2 1/2 litres of fuel for 100 cows.
4. Machalo: About 10 kms east of Urara also dug in 1981. It was never completed because the water was found to be unfit for animals or humans.
5. Boji: About 40 kms east of Malka Galla, 30 kms beyond Bassa. Borehole can carry about 2,000 cattle per day - requires 2 litres of fuel per 100 head of cattle. Dug in 1978
6. Dolo Kote: Incomplete though also dug in 1978. 10 kms from Boji, about 50 kms from Habus Wein. Habus Wein is 15 kms from the border of Wajir District at Ade Misa Jida.
7. Shura: 60 kms northwest of Yamicha - 43 kms from Marsabit. This well is only used in times of worst drought in Merti division.
One example of risk taking in grazing strategies.
This last borehole at Shura was mentioned as important even though it is outside the Waso area, close to Marsabit. It was used by several of the main herdsmen a few months previously, between the first and second survey periods. They believe that it saved them from some of the worst losses experienced by those who kept their animals further south. One of the leading herdsmen, Hersi Halake said that he thought a pan should be built between Yamicha and Shura as that 60 kms distance with no water was too far for the cattle to walk. He suggested that this new pan could replace the large pan at Yamicha which was too close (five kms) to the borehole. The Yamicha pan should be filled in because it allowed the Somali cattle to graze in the Yamicha area whilst the Borana were allowing that grazing to lie fallow. This meant that when the Borana returned in the dry season and the borehole pumps were reinstalled the grazing was already half finished.
This is the situation that the Borana faced in the 1992 drought when Hersi Halake was the chairman of the borehole management committee at Yamicha where he had taken his animals.
To show the importance of the Yamicha borehole in serving a wide area of the Waso Borana he mentioned that the committee of 12 men consisted of 5 from Malka Galla, 4 from Merti and 3 from Sericho on the other side of the river. The committee decided to send 5 men as scouts to verify that there was grass and water at Shura. They were away for five days, 18-23 April and brought a good report. On 25th to 28th April most of the herders decided to try to "make it" to Shura. 36 bomas (herds) set out, about 7,000 cattle with approximately 200 herdsmen. Some men lost half of their animals on that trip as they were very weak before they started. Hersi Halake thanked God that he only lost 4 cattle out of the 26 which he had when he left Yamicha.
This account is given in full as it show not only how the herdsmen made their reports but also because it is a good example of the risk-taking decisions they have to make.
The opportunity was taken to go personally to visit Yamicha during the second period of field research when Hersi Halake wanted to go back there as part of his campaign to run for election as County Councillor to represent the people of Malka Dalla in northeastern division. This gave useful insights into nomadic pastoral life as well as information into the operation of a typical borehole. These will be recorded as an indication of the practical realities of providing the water supply which can open up grazing for thousands of animals which would otherwise be unusable:-
Yamicha borehole details.
95 kms from Merti, 63 from Malka Galla, the nearest semi-permanent community of Waso Borana. Powered by a Petter 9.5 kva 2 cylinder engine and generator. The engine has not been 'opened' since new in 1986. It runs for 4 - 6 months per year for up to 18 hours per day. It can supply 10,800 head normally, up to 16,000 maximum. The operator, called Hussein Alkano from Merti, has worked at Yamicha for 8 years, one of 7 operators working at boreholes in Isiolo District - all Borana men. They get 4 months training in minor maintenance. Wages are paid by the government but all operating expenses are paid by the herd owners - oil, fuel, filters and spare parts. The operators work with a local committee which decides when each herd shall come for water. There are 12 men on a committee, 6 of whom will be on duty at the borehole at any time. The machines (diesel engines and generators) are removed as soon as the rains begin and taken to the nearest town, Malka Galla or Merti. There did not seem to be any preventative maintenance undertaken during these non-operating times. It was said, "The engines are only opened when they break down.
Maintenance of the boreholes
Keeping the generators functioning reliably is obviously of critical importance. If they break down all the cattle dependent on that borehole have to be moved away almost immediately. As the nearest alternative water source may be 60 kilometres away, the cattle have to begin the journey as soon as the generator fails if they are to have any chance of survival. The Ministry of Water Development has the responsibility for constructing and maintaining the boreholes. Isiolo District Headquarters is located at the extreme western corner of the district about 4 hours drive from the start of the main grazing areas in Garba Tula and Merti division. The Ministry of Water Development, like all the other government ministries, have their offices in Isiolo town, with more than three quarters of the staff on the payroll for the whole district located in Isiolo town.
The water department has a large workshop there which is primarily meant to service and repair the generators and submersible pumps of the boreholes. In practice it is engaged much more in the repair of the vehicles belonging to the Ministry of Water Development which, like the staff, appear to spend more than 75 per cent of their time in Isiolo town. In 1992 some of the technical staff of this ministry did move out into Merti division to undertake the construction of a new pumping and watering site, called Duma. The borehole had been dug several years previously by one of the oil exploration companies working in northeast Kenya, but abandoned when the exploration work was terminated. The cost of equipment and materials for the construction of the generator house and water storage tanks and troughs was provided by a donor agency called, Action Aid. At the time of the visit at the end of July 1992 the work was almost completed but had come to a halt.
The construction crew under the direction of the Deputy District Water Engineer had been arrested for trying to sell a truck load of cement in Marsabit town. This was cement paid for and delivered to the site by Action Aid. The ministry workers had loaded the cement onto a ministry lorry and hauled it across the rarely used desert road to Marsabit, about 6 hours drive away. The Action Aid supervisor had rightly suspected that this had happened once before and alerted the police in Marsabit to be on the lookout for a Ministry of Water Development vehicle from Isiolo district. This is just another example of the realities of implementing development projects in remote areas where the people employed to do the job are not from the area where they are working and have no interest in the problems of the society whom they are meant to be serving. It is not surprising that the only members of the Ministry of Water Development who could be found serving on the job as borehole pump operators were all Borana men - most of them having worked for 8 or more years in these isolated locations. This commitment to the needs of the local Borana herdsmen points out the value of training local men to do all the work needed in such areas.
Another example of misused development aid.
Another example of the need for involving local people was illustrated by the empty workshop in Merti town. The British government had constructed and equipped this at a cost of more than 2 million shillings. The High Commissioner flew up to Merti in May 1991 to open the splendid facility, complete with all the essential machinery and tools needed for borehole maintenance. The next day all the movable equipment was loaded on the Ministry of Water Development vehicles and hauled back to Isiolo, leaving the magnificent new building at Merti empty and unused since that day. When questions were asked at the headquarters in Isiolo as to what was happening to the workshop the answer was given that there were no mechanics or technical staff at Merti so the tools and equipment would be more useful in the Isiolo workshop. It was pointed out that in the event of a breakdown at any of the boreholes in the grazing areas this meant at least eight hours journey to get even the simplest repair. The Isiolo based staff replied that their primary responsibility is to the people of Isiolo town, there is no suitable housing in Merti and very little means of transportation to get there. At a subsequent meeting at the British High Commission I made the suggestion that this might be a good place to use the Merti workshop as a training facility for a new generation of technicians from the Borana people. They have enough young men who have been through the secondary schools at Isiolo and Garba Tula and have proven their ability and willingness to come back to teach or do whatever work needs to be done in their home areas. The High Commission representative concurred with this proposal but felt the security risk in that area of Kenya would probably preclude its implementation, showing another secondary consequence of the problem of insecurity.
5.5. Risk taking choices.
Another example of the need to take risks in successful herd management was shown by the experience of other herd owners who chose not to go north of the river. There were a few who decided to take a chance of finding enough grazing within the Ewaso Nyiro flood plain but the type of coarse grass which the animals had to resort to eating was not good for cattle or shoats. They could be assured of sufficient water but many of the animals died of starvation before the rains returned. An example of this reluctance to take the risk of going nomadic was demonstrated by our primary host Dida Kalicha. He lost 40 percent of his cattle and 90 per cent of his shoats during the last year in between the two survey periods.
Two reasons for not taking the risk of moving .
There were two reasons why he made the decision not to move. First was that he and his wives and son had all planted extensive crops of corn, about five hectares in total in March when the river Ewaso Nyiro flooded after several months with no flowing water. These fields are irrigated by crude ditches supplied by a main furrow dug collectively be all in the community who want to cooperate in the small scale river bank cultivation schemes. Their fields had received two full waterings and needed one more to yield any harvest. Dida Kalicha took the decision to keep his family together to irrigate and protect the crops that they did eventually receive when the water came but it was by his estimation less than 1/4 of what they might have harvested. The second reason why Dida Kalicha did not take the unknown risk of sending his animals away to look for better grazing is that he receives a pension from the government for his services as senior chief. He was willing to admit that it was enough to live on. This cash income has given him a measure of freedom from the struggles of the other pastoralists as well as allowing him to acquire some drinking habits which consume more time and money than his fellow herd owners can afford.
The 'pros. and cons.' of the third option.
The third option of risk open to the herd owners in Merti is to send all or part of their herds and family across the river, heading for Kinna at the southern end of Garba Tula division. During the first half of 1992 considerably more rains fell in the southern and more elevated Garba Tula division of Isiolo district. The grazing was consequently relatively much better than in the Merti division, north of the Ewaso Nyiro river. When the drought in the north became more severe at the beginning of the year many families began to move south into Garba Tula division, particularly towards the more fertile location around Kinna. This was in spite of the much greater danger from shifta attacks in Garba Tula district. It was obvious that since the last observation five years ago there had been a major shift of population from Garba Tula town to Kinna about 40 kilometres to the south. The population of Kinna may have more than doubled during that period, whilst the former administrative center of Garba Tula has correspondingly declined. It was said that this was due mainly to the shifta attacks on the town in the first quarter of 1992.
The families who did not move south towards Kinna had more security but took a serious risk of losing their cattle through lack of rain. This provides a good example of the risk taking choices which are an inevitable part of nomadic pastoralism. For those in eastern Isiolo who chose not to go south there were two options. One was to go north to the Yamicha and Shura boreholes as already described. The other was to stay near the limited amount of riverine vegetation left in the Lorian Swamp which rapidly diminished as the Ewaso Nyiro river dried up. This could only support a small proportion of the milk cows and the small stock. The majority of the cattle, particularly the non-milking fora herd has to be taken northwards, at least 50 kilometres to find the nearest alternative grazing where their survival depends on the two or three boreholes still functioning. This shows the importance of maintaining the pumping machinery and the need to provide more water sources at the locations identified by the herdsmen which will allow maximum use of the grazing that is presently unusable due to lack of water.
The risks of disease and shifta attacks at Kinna.
Those who chose to take their animals to Kinna knew that they faced another risk besides the danger of Somali raiding parties. That area is renowned for the higher incidence of disease - particularly tick borne cattle diseases. The Borana all understand that it is the thicker vegetation and greater rainfall at Kinna that causes the ticks to proliferate and the diseases to afflict the animals. Kinna is only about 500 feet higher in elevation that the northern grazing plains but the increased rainfall is probably due to their proximity to Mount Kenya and the northern slopes of the Nyambeni hills.
Several herd owners who drove their animals to Kinna said they knew they would get sick but it was a decision only taken when there was no alternative. The educated Chief of Sericho said that his father warned him never to take his animals to Kinna, "They will die if they go there." In spite of that warning he felt it was their only hope in the light of their past experience when the shiftas were active. His home at Sericho is situated at the extreme eastern edge of Isiolo district closest to the Somalis. In 1981 he lost 350 cattle in one raid. At the beginning of 1993 shifta took more than 3,500 of the Sericho cattle which were being grazed across the river. One man lost 800 animals in that raid. The Chief had no regrets about sending his herd of 120 to Kinna in August 1992. By the time they returned to Sericho there were only 50 remaining. He expressed his sadness for the other Sericho owners - especially as the raid came after the rains had returned and everyone thought their troubles were over with the animals that had survived the drought. "We have always lost more animals to the shifta than to drought and disease.", he concluded.
5.6. Marketting options.
Several questions were included in the field research which sought to elicit the attitude of the Borana to the possibility of strategic marketing options. The discussions that ensued show that this is a situation where the thinking of pastoralists and what may be described as commercial or common sense values show the widest divergence.
Two questions from a commercial view point.
To illustrate this point two questions will be mentioned which would appear to make good economic sense from a business point of view. The first was "If you have too many animals for the available grazing would you be willing to sell at a guaranteed minimum price?" It was usually necessary to amplify the question by giving the following example. "Last year at the height of the drought you were fortunate if you could sell a cow for 500 shilling. This year, after the drought you can sell an average beast for 5000 shillings. Would it not be better to be sure of getting 2,500 shillings at any time you needed to sell?" The response which came from all the Borana was almost unanimous. "Yes, they would accept a minimum guaranteed price as long as it was 5000 or even 6000 shillings." The only difference of opinion came on how high the guaranteed price should be. None of those who heard the question and this usually included all the dozens of interested onlookers, thought to point out that no herd owner is going to sell an animal at that price when the grazing is good. He would only do so when the drought is causing problems.
A later similar question tried to approach the same subject from a different direction. "Would you be willing to sell an animal for a lower fixed price if you could be sure of getting the same price in drought times?" The answer to this one was again almost unanimous. "No!" If anything else was added it was usually something such as, "We like to bargain the price, even if we get less money." Only one herd owner, the most educated, Chief of Sericho, replied that he thought it might be a good idea. Even he did not say that he would be willing to accept the proposal and try it. It is concluded from the wide agreement on these questions regarding the concept of guaranteed minimum price that Borana herd owners will not easily relinquish their traditional practice of selling their animals when they see fit and at whatever price they can get at that time.
Differences in value systems.
These responses illustrate the differences in the value system between market orientated economies and nomadic pastoralists. Cattle are not just a financial asset to the Borana, they are a way of life, a cultural treasure that gives the pastoralist his identity and sense of worth. It is this difference in value, probably more than any other that can be used to define a pastoralist society. This apparently "irrational" value system needs to be appreciated by development planners working amongst nomadic pastoralists.
Inappropriate marketting plans.
One example of an inappropriate plan to improve productivity and marketting that shows no awareness of the values of pastoralists involved a proposed calf rearing programme. This was mentioned in several of the interviews with the Borana herdsmen as the worst possible thing that could happen to them. It was a scheme that would allow them to breed and rear calves to a certain age such as one or two years old, after which they could be taken away to commercial fattening farms further south in Kenya. This proposal was strongly opposed by the Borana who objected to it by saying, "We would have to face all the work and the risk of the most vulnerable stage of cattle rearing and somebody else will get the pleasure and the profit of the mature animal." Another more practical comment was, "Most of us have so few adult animals left that it the government takes them away how can we produce any calves?'
Ranching and grazing blocks.
Another proposal which appeared in the Isiolo District Development Plan for 1984-1988 was for the establishing of 4 ranches and 4 grazing blocks in the district. These proposals featured prominently again in the 1989-1993 plans, even though it had to be admitted that none were implemented during the previous 4 year plan period. The relevant passage in the 1989-1993 District Development plan will be quoted at length as being a good example of official declarations and proposals which ignore some of the basic realities on the ground such as the lack of security and the values and aspirations of the pastoralists.
LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT
Policy and Objectives
The Department's top priority is to help produce the food needed for national self-sufficiency. Isiolo District can best contribute to this goal through increasing livestock production. The national Livestock Development Policy emphasized better conservation and use of natural resources in developing livestock. Therefore, over the plan period the District intends promoting livestock health by constructing more cattle crushes and dips, and increasing the off take rate.
Review of 1984-88 Plan Period
Livestock production in the District is carried on by pastoralists. The District has no ranches, though four were proposed during the 1983-88 plan period but none were implemented. Livestock production performance in the District was satisfactory during the previous plan period. This is evident in the livestock population figures of the district shown on Table 3.3 below.
Table 3.3
Source: Livestock Production Development Department File
Unrealistic plans only invite rejection and ridicule.
On the whole, the District has vast resources for livestock production. It is with this recognition that the Kenya Government came up with ides of establishing grazing blocks. (Merti Grazing Block, Sericho Grazing Block, Garbatulla Grazing Block). These are promoted by developing adequate and well distributed water resources and other essential infrastructure within the grazing blocks. They aim to facilitate sound utilization and conservation and where necessary rehabilitation of forage resources. It is anticipated that when the schemes are fully implemented, proper management of livestock will be enhanced, so that even droughts will not pose a great danger to the livestock members. (Isiolo District Development Plan 1989-1993, pp. 70-71)
These statements can serve as typical of most government policies regarding nomadic pastoralists. The primary objective in Isiolo district is to "increase the off take rate". To accomplish that certain actions were proposed in the 1989-1993 plan including the establishing of the four ranches that had been proposed for the 1983-1988 plan. The Waso Borana were fully cognisant of that proposal made in 1989 and delighted that this Government project had never even got started.
The final paragraph acknowledges the potential within Isiolo district with it's "vast resources for livestock production". It speaks confidently of the promotion of the 4 grazing blocks by "developing adequate and well distributed water resources, and even the necessary rehabilitation of forage resources. The fact that there is virtually nothing to show on the ground for all these paper proposals after 10 years is surely an indication of inappropriate or irrelevant planning. The extent of the irrelevance and remoteness from reality is shown in the conclusion of the paragraph of lofty intentions when it states that the "proper management of the district plan for livestock development will mean that "even droughts will not pose a great danger to the livestock members'.
Without security in the grazing areas all plans are futile.
The government officers who drew up this plan appear to have missed two major factors which the Borana pastoralists can never forget. The first and by far the most serious is the security situation in Eastern Isiolo. The Borana complain most bitterly about the constant shifta attacks and blame the government authorities for not taking the necessary action to control intrusion from Wajir district. Without that control the razing blocks proposals are meaningless.
Distrust and resentment of government officials.
The other factor not acknowledged by the District Development Plan as regards livestock development is the harsh reality of drought. For this the pastoralists obviously do not hold the government responsible but they do strongly criticise the attitude of the officials in Isiolo who are not willing to come and live and work at their tasks in the field.
This was the response given by several herdsmen when they were shown the District Development Plan. "If they ever came to live in the bush they would not write such rubbish". "what do they know about drought when they sit in the bars in Isiolo!" these were some of the politer and more respectable comments made but they show something of the problems in implementation of Development Plans which do not involve pastoralists at every stage.
This has particular application for another stated objective of the District Development Plan in which it proposes the appointment of Livestock Extensions Officers who "shall penetrate the District to try to change the traditional concept of keeping livestock for social prestige. Through education the aim will be to create awareness among pastoralists that in, the modern world, livestock rearing should be considered to be an economic investment that could earn them money for their domestic requirements' ibid p. 75.
It is difficult to imagine how this objective could be accomplished without a major change in attitude and relations between the pastoralists and the government sent from Isiolo.
5.7. Veterinary services.
This is obviously a very important subject to people depending on animals for their survival. The questionnaire therefore contained several questions which were intended to stimulate discussion and evaluation of veterinary services provided by the government.
The district veterinary office and services.
A visit was also made to the district veterinary office in Isiolo town which showed lists on the walls indicating a full staff of officers, technicians, assistants, secretaries and drivers in each of the main population centres. In practice this service proved to be the most ineffective and "invisible" of all the government departments. Outside Isiolo town its services were virtually non existent. There had been no veterinary officer anywhere in Garba Tula or Merti divisions for at least two years. Several of the main settlements where the biggest concentration of animals are found reported no visit for three or even four years. Some pastoralists acknowledged that vaccination teams used to come around every year, others said that the veterinary people would come if there was a serious outbreak of disease. All conceded that it was the shifta problem which scared these government people away. There was unanimous agreement that it was no use asking veterinary personnel from southern Kenya to come to Isiolo district to work in the bush. They would not get beyond Isiolo town. "They get that far then spend all their days waiting for a transfer to another place, was the general opinion. This same complaint was levelled at all the different government service departments.
The solution suggested was, "Give us Borana or the son of any nomad pastoralist. They will not run away. Even if they are not so well trained they will do something for us. What is the good of a University trained veterinarian or livestock officer who is afraid to go out to the bush". This was probably the strongest complaint we heard during the interviews.
Cattle dips and vaccination programmes.
In all of Eastern Isiolo only one veterinary laboratory had been established, in the southernmost town of Kinna. There was also a dip but neither of these had been used since 1991. That was when the three full time staff left and had been "sitting in Isiolo ever since." This meant that there had been no vaccinations for three years in Kinna, even though this was known to be the place where sicknesses were more prevalent due to the higher rainfall and humidity caused by the relatively higher altitude and proximity to the Nyambene Hills. The main diseases reported at Kinna were East Coast Fever, Tetse Fly, Pneumonia, and Liver Fluke.
There were two other dips in the whole of eastern Isiolo but both of these were broken down and had not been used for several years. The Italian company building the irrigation scheme at Merti had constructed an excellent dip at the other end of the town with water piped to the site. This was apparently a gesture of good will to the Borana pastoralists who were criticizing all the money being spent on the irrigation scheme. It had not yet been used at the time of our visit in March 1993 as it had not been resolved who will pay for the medicine to put in the dip.
5.8. Restocking possibilities and NGO programmes
The most edifying and encouraging response to matters relating to livestock came in answers to the question, "If a family loses all their animals is there anybody whom they can ask for help to recover?" With only one exception the reply was given without hesitation that, "The clan will help.". The one exception was a very poor man who was deliberately selected to represent the most marginalised Borana who are able and willing to survive in dependence on the Catholic Mission. They are given a subsistence level of grain and beans and cooking oil. For those with sufficient strength this can be supplemented periodically by casual labour for the Mission which gives both men and women an equal wage. This amounted to about 20 pence or 30 cents US per day early in 1993. The poor man in question did not divulge the information during the interview but it was learned later that he was one of the Wata section of the Borana. There are many such people now living in towns and dependent on the charity of NGO's. They were, until this generation, traditionally hunters with no interest or experience in pastoralism. That is presumably why this Wata man said that nobody in his clan would help him replenish his herd. This social feature of the Wata needs to be appreciated and taken into account when making any development plans for the most impoverished Borana, especially plans involving animals. There is little point in trying to restock people from non-pastoralist backgrounds.
NGO restocking programmes.
Two examples of externally funded restocking programmes have been attempted in Garba Tula Division. The first was introduced in 1983 by a social anthropologist Richard Hogg whom the Borana still remember very favourably as Halakey. They described it as a good effort to try to help some of the poorest people after a long period of drought. It was used as a pilot programme for a larger effort beginning the following year in Turkana.
Richard Hogg's restocking scheme.
Hogg describes the objectives and implementation of the two programmes thus:
11. The main reasons for launching the programme were:
i. Both Turkana and Isiolo Districts are especially suited to extensive livestock herding.
ii. Both Turkana and Boran have a long history of pastoral nomadism and, contrary to the popular view, are efficient herd managers.
iii. Livestock, especially small stock, offer the best prospect of rapid capital growth, and thus an escape from relief camps and failed irrigation projects.
iv. Both Districts have large areas which are undergrazed, while small areas are heavily grazed. Re-stocking offers the hope of a more even distribution of both people and stock.
v. There is increasing inequality in the distribution of livestock, with livestock increasingly concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. Re-stocking through a re-distribution of livestock between households offers the hope of a more equitable distribution of wealth.
vi. There is a large population of pastoralists who have been destitutes for some years and who want to return to the pastoral sector.
vii. Alternative development programmes, such as irrigation development, have proved costly failures.
12. The main objectives of the programme was to re-establish in the pastoral sector through the provision of grain for one year, a viable flock, baggage animals and camping equipment (water containers, cooking pots, pangas) destitute Boran and Turkana families. The World Food programme agreed to supply maize with which to buy stock.
13. Certain conditions were attached to the purchase of stock 1) all stock were to be bought locally and 2) as many stock as possible were to be bought with maize. As far as the selection of families was concerned this was to be left to whoever was to implement the programme. The guiding principle was that each family had to be both willing and able to look after the stock they received.
14. Because of my knowledge of Isiolo District Oxfam asked me to implement the Isiolo programme. They later asked me to implement the pilot programme in Turkana.
15. The Isiolo Programme was implemented over 3 months from September to November 1983. All of the 70 families selected to take part were former tenants of Malka Dakaa irrigation scheme. Twenty-one per cent were female headed, which reflected the large number of such families at the scheme. The average family size was 7.
16. Each family received 50 small stock made-up of the following stock:
Goats: 5 milk tooth does; 3 bucks
Sheep: 35 milk tooth ewes; 1 ram; 6 wethers
In addition, each family received 1-2 donkeys, 180kg maize, 2 jerrycans, 2 metal cooking pots and 1 panga. The maize-livestock exchange rate was 2.4kg maize to 1kg liveweight. Only 60% of the small stock were bought with maize, the rest, including all the donkeys were bought with cash. The total cost of the package, including staff salaries, transport and camping equipment, was 16,000/- or US $1230 per family, fifteen times less than establishing the same family on an irrigation scheme in Turkana.
17. The stock was given outright and there was no expectation of any 'payback' in the form of lamb/kids at a later date. The only expectation was that those who received stock should look after them responsibly and that Oxfam be allowed to monitor the progress of the flock at regular intervals. For this purpose three local Boran school leavers were employed. (Restocking Pastoralists In Kenya: A Strategy for Relief and Rehabilitation. Pastoral Development network Paper 19c. pp. 5-7. ODI London)
The pastoralists view of Hogg's scheme.
Most of these points were seen as positive by the Borana in the long discussions that ensued on this subject. The only question they had concerned the decision to select all the families to be restocked from the former tenants of the Malka Daka irrigation scheme. It was acknowledged that the people in that community were in dire need after the failure of the scheme but the point was made that many of those who went to join the scheme were not competent pastoralists or even "good Borana". There were alleged to be a high proportion of "difficult people" - those rejected by their communities for stealing, drunkenness, laziness, Miraa addiction or "bad wives". This latter case is presumably the reason why Hogg found a large number of female headed families. Hogg does state that "In selecting families for the programme I deliberately, excluded the very old and weak and those who, in my opinion, would not 'make it' back to the pastoral sector. I positively discriminated in favour of those with at least a few livestock ( the cut off point was a somewhat arbitrary 15 small stock)". ibid. p.11.
Who runs the restocking programme?
If there was a fault in this serious and sincere effort it would seem to rest in the decision made by the donor organisation, Oxfam that Hogg should implement and administer the programme. He was to choose the recipients personally and buy the shoats himself. This latter stipulation must have been no easy assignment for an anthropologist. During the second period of field research contact was made with one of the three young Borana men he employed as monitors of the programme, He spoke most appreciatively of 'Halakey' but unfortunately could give very few details about the programme after 10 years so no evaluation could be made from information gained from that local source.
The Catholic restocking programme.
The comments made concerning Richard Hogg's re-stocking work make interesting comparisons with the second programme attempted in Garba Tula district in 1990-1991. This was planned, financed and implemented by the Catholic Mission at Garba Tula under the direction of Brother Andre, an American missionary worker. Here again every effort was made to begin with the poorest people in the community selected by a committee comprised of Brother Andre's workers and friends as being most in need. These turned out to be mostly destitute widows or rejected wives who were trying to support several children. It is difficult to understand why there were so many women with children to support as in normal Borana society widows are automatically remarried to the brother or closest male relative of her late husband. Unmarried women or those refusing to live with a husband stay in her father's house. Even in the families influenced by Islam where wives are divorced, the children stay with their father. More than a hundred needy women were identified and about half as many men. A rather smaller number of animals was determined as adequate to allow a return to pastoral life, 30 shoats were designated as sufficient with no cattle or donkeys.
Who buys the animals?
The shoats were bought by traders who were allowed an average local market figure to buy and bring them to Garba Tula. Some of the traders chose to buy the animals from distant areas where the price would be considerably lower. They then had to pay the costs of bringing the animals to Garba Tula. If they elected to drive them long distances by foot they would arrive in weaker condition. Animals that came from distant places were more likely to be affected by different diseases and changes in browsing vegetation. Before the animals were given out to the selected recipient every effort was made to ensure that the animals were vaccinated against all the common diseases affecting small stock in Isiolo District.
The Catholic Missionaries at Garba Tula reported that they had spent more than a million shillings on this restocking programme by the end of 1991. Then came the outbreak of a devastating sickness affecting small ruminant stock called Nairobi Sheep Disease carried by ticks. These had proliferated in the unusually high humidity prevailing in Garba Tula during 1991.
Problems with the Catholic restocking programme.
Brother Andre was able to identify the cause of the disease and rushed to Nairobi to get the medicine to kill the ticks. It required dipping all the animals in the area, if they were not to be immediately re infected. There was only one dip in the whole of Garba Tula/Merti area which was usable. Brother Andre said the Borana would not use it as they claim it was only suitable for cattle. Even more discouraging was the fact that a few individuals who did seem willing to try the dipping treatment were not willing to pay the smallest amount of 1 shilling per head to save their animals. This lack of interest in even a token contribution towards the heavily subsidized costs may have been part of the reason why the Catholic Mission has given up the restocking programme.
It would seem to indicate more likely the attitude of the Borana living around Garba Tula who have become largely dependent on Catholic welfare. Borana in other areas do not speak very highly of those "pitiful Miraa chewers" around Garba Tula. This seems to be confirmed by a comment from the local trucker in Garba Tula that he was bringing in about one million shillings worth of Miraa to this area each month until 1991 when he gave up the business as he realised that shifta were attacking the Miraa carrying vehicles.
Criticisms of the Catholic restocking programme.
The main criticism of the Catholic programme again concerned the administration of it. Brother Andre adopted the same approach as Richard Hogg in selecting several local young school leavers to form his committee and implement the programme. They were obviously very bright and had a good command of English, but being from the town of Garba Tula they had to respond to the inevitable pressures to care for their own relatives first, some of whom were Wata people as previously noted.
Several instances were mentioned of families where the husband was lazy or wasted all his money on drink or more often Miraa. In such cases we were told that the clan would give milk or money to the wife to buy food for the children but animals would not be given as the husband would soon sell them to pay for his addiction. Several examples of this were found in Garba Tula where those who received shoats from the Catholic restocking programme had either sold them all within a year to buy Miraa or more likely neglected to take care of the animals properly whilst they "hung around the verandahs waiting for the next Miraa truck to come". As mentioned earlier these were probably Wata people who did not value or know how to herd animals. When this situation was being discussed in another adjacent settlement who pride themselves on their goat herds they made the comment that the Catholic Father should never have wasted his goats on those Wata people. "Better give them a pack of dogs so that they can go hunting as they don't know how to look after goats or cattle."
5.9. The Borana pastoralists ideas about restocking.
In the light of observations made and criticisms heard during the 1992 first reconnaissance survey several questions were included in the questionnaire which were intended to allow the Borana to give their recommendation for the effective operation of restocking programmes.
The minimum number of animals needed.
The answers to the first question, `What is the bare minimum number of animals required for the survival of an average Borana family?' varied widely ranging, from 5 to 100 cows, 10 to 200 shoats. The minimum number needed for the needs of a family will of course depend on the number in that household. There did not seem to be any pattern in the decision about the minimum needed, such as a dependence on the social position or the wealth of the man being interviewed. For instance the two most wealthy men in terms of herd sizes before the drought gave responses with the widest disparity. They both lost heavily during the 1992 drought, one from 1000 shoats to 10 remaining, the other from 450 cattle to 60 remaining. The estimates they gave for the minimum needed for survival of the family were 100 cows and 200 shoats by the man who lost 990 shoats, 10 cows and 50 shoats by the other ex chief who used to have 450 cows. Interestingly as he is the man with 26 children, so presumably the needs of his family would be higher than anybody else's.
The second question relating to NGO administered restocking programmes consisted of five parts to cover as far as possible all the relevant issues discerned from the previous attempts. These questions generated more interest and discussion than any other part of the interviews and produced some of the illuminating information.
If some agency offered to restock those most in need:
1. Who should choose the people to receive?
2. Who should receive first?
3. Where should the animals come from?
4. Should the recipient be expected to give back for others?
5. If so after how long?
Who should choose the recipients?
The response to the first part of this question closely corresponded to the answer to the earlier question about whom a Borana can ask for help if he loses all his animals. It was un-hesitatingly stated that the elders of the appropriate clan will be the ones who will decide. If there are families suffering from several different clans then they will form a committee to make sure that everybody will be equally considered. There appeared to be no doubt that the elders would act fairly and not favour their own immediate families. "The honour involved in being an elder would not allow them to be unfair", was the sort of comment which accompanied their reply. It was also stated in several interviews that if a man suffers great losses he does not need to go to the elders for help. They will meet together themselves and decide who from his clan should give animals and how many. Most respondents said that they had been given animals at some time in the past. There appeared to be no hesitation to accept gift animals or embarrassment in admitting it. All said that they will give back those animals and their off spring "with thanks for them" if they see the donor has lost his herd. Other respondents told of another system of "loaned cows" that a Borana could ask back if ever he wanted them but that seemed to be different from the given cow which nobody would ask to get back.
Repayment of restocked animals.
Every one interviewed said emphatically that no Borana would give back the animals they had received from a restocking programme. Such a suggestion seemed to be inconceivable and even offensive in Borana culture, and may be common to all pastoralists. This does not seem to be understood by some of the restocking programmes that have been tried in Africa which usually stipulate that anyone who receives an animal from the donor agency must be willing to give one or more offspring back to the project to serve as a revolving fund. From this it is deduced that if a restocking programme is planned for a pastoralist society then it should not involve any requirement for the recipients to give back some or all of the animals or their off-spring. This may seem a legitimate or desirable principal to establish, judged by western standards, but it may not be acceptable to third world cattle herders. Whether it might be possible to apply the system of "loaned cows" in societies where this is known is a subject that requires investigation. This researcher is aware that the largest pastoralist group in West Africa called the Fulani have a similar tradition of 'loan cows' which can be `recalled' by the donor. Whether this would extend to an external donor who wanted to apply the system to establish the principle of a "revolving fund" of stock to be given to the poor is another matter. In both East and West Africa it is the clan elders who will decide how and when animals should be given and who shall receive them. They would presumably decide whether `loan cows' can be given and returned.
Who should receive first?
The other important question relating to restocking is that contained in part 2. "Who should receive first?" Here again there was general agreement from all respondents. It usually began with "the poorest men or women who will take care of the animals" When further questions were asked about this the informants nearly all replied that a woman with many children but no husband would probably be given precedence over a man with children but no wife. If it was asked how a woman with many children could be expected to look after her animals it was explained that a close relative or one of the elders would take care of the animals for her until the children were able to look after them. She would be able to take the milk and sell or eat them for meat as she needed. This led to other useful insights about the programme tried by Father Andre in Garba Tula. One problem identified was that he depended on a team of young educated Borana from Garba Tula to decide how to implement it. "They decided who should receive the animals and as most of them were Wata who knew nothing about Borana restocking traditions they gave the animals away foolishly." Even the elders in Garba Tula were considered to be ruined by Miraa and "drinking the milk" of the Catholics. This seemed to be the sad result of all the shifta attacks on Garba Tula which has caused all the men with herds to go far away. Those who remain have lost their animals and they are now dependent on the mission or Miraa or both.
Where should the animals come from?
The final part of this restocking question referred to the matter of where should the animals come from which will be given away. This was included in the light of what had been learned in 1992 after the abandonment of the Garba Tula Catholic mission restocking efforts. In that scheme it was felt that there was little point in buying the animals from local owners of large herds of goats and sheep. It was argued that this would only make the rich men richer. The Borana herdsmen told us that in reality it would have meant that those who received money for their shoats would have spent most of it buying cattle. This would have been better for local grazing needs as cattle and goats eat different things. If you keep on bringing more small stock into the area then the grazing for shoats will be over loaded whilst that suitable for cattle will be under utilised. This seemed to make good sense but probably because of the inexperience of the programme planners the Catholic restocking programme concentrated on bringing in shoats from distant places.
The disadvantages of using traders to do the purchasing.
Money was given to traders to buy whatever animals they could find from any market at a price which was approximately the same as that prevailing in the market at Garba Tula. If the trader wanted to go far away to Mandera or even into Somali and buy the animals for a cheaper price then he could keep whatever was left over after transport costs. I was told by informants in Garba Tula that this gave the opportunity for unscrupulous traders to bring in all sorts of sheep and goats that had various defects and unknown sicknesses. It was a good way for any shoat owner to dispose of his sterile ewes as the purchaser would not be likely to come back complaining of their failure to reproduce. Some traders brought their stock in lorries from far away places where the climate and grazing was quite different from Garba Tula. Mandera was one such place mentioned from which animals should not be brought as many of them will die in Garba Tula. Other traders brought their shoats over long distances on foot so that by the time they got to Garba Tula they were weak and exhausted. It was even suggested that some of the least reputable traders did not pay anything for the animals they bought. In other words they were stolen from somewhere sufficiently distant and taken quickly by trucks to Garba Tula so that they could not be followed.
There was one other component of the field research questionnaire which quickly became obvious was of top priority to the Borana in relation to their livestock. This came out of discussions on the questions about their view of the Government administration and the expectations they have from the different departments and officials who are supposed to be responsible for administering and protecting the Borana. The discussions on that page of the questionnaire revealed that they have very little expectations from the Kenya government except to protect them from raiding attacks from other pastoralists, stealing not just their livestock but in the long term, intent on taking their land. This subject of security and the related bitter complaint against the government of not allowing the Borana to have adequate weapons to defend themselves will be carried over to the next chapter, appearing in section 6.1. Administration and security.